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Abstract
This paper demonstrates that the reason for widespread default of mortgages
in the subprime market was a sudden reversal in the house price appreciation of
the early 2000￿ s. Using loan-level data on subprime mortgages, we observe that
the majority of subprime loans were hybrid adjustable rate mortgages, designed
to impose substantial ￿nancial burden on reset to the fully indexed rate. In a
regime of rising house prices, a ￿nancially distressed borrower could avoid default
by prepaying the loan and our results indicate that subprime mortgages originated
between 1998 and 2005 had extremely high prepayment rates. Most important,
prepayment rates on subprime mortgages were extremely high (i) not just for ARMs
but FRMs as well, (ii) even before the reset dates on hybrid-ARMs and (iii) despite
prepayment penalties on the contract. However, a sudden reversal in house price
appreciation increased default in this market because it made this prepayment exit
option cost-prohibitive. In short, prepayments sustained the subprime boom and
the extremely high default rates on 2006-2007 vintages were largely due to the
inability of these mortgages to prepay (an option that was available for mortgages
of earlier vintages).
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11 Introduction
The recent crisis in the subprime mortgage market is arguably one of the landmark events
in recent ￿nancial history. The extraordinary growth of the subprime mortgage market
in the ￿rst part of this decade and its subsequent demise in 2006-2007 is of interest to
both academics and policymakers. However, much of the workings of this market are not
fully understood. It is even less clear as to what caused this market to collapse from its
peak in the second quarter of 2005.
This paper seeks to understand what went wrong in this market. Our aim is to provide
a rationale behind the sharp rise in borrower defaults on subprime mortgages during
2006 and 2007. To determine the causes of the subprime crisis, we use a large, unique
loan level database on subprime mortgages. The database records lender, borrower and
mortgage characteristics as well as repayment behavior (prepayments, delinquencies and
foreclosures) on individual mortgages.
Our results show that subprime mortgages originated between 1998 and 2006 had
very high prepayment rates and prepayment speeds (see Table 1). For all subprime orig-
inations and across all product types, at least half of all loans were prepaid within the
￿rst ￿ve years after origination.1 Aside from being current on their mortgage payments,
￿nancially distressed borrowers can avoid default and foreclosure by prepaying their loans
(either through a re￿nance or a property sale). Clearly, prepayments are crucial to under-
standing the subprime crisis. This begs the obvious questions: Why were prepayments
so high in the subprime market? What sustained such high prepayment rates?
There are several reasons behind the high prepayment rates in the subprime mortgage
market. To begin with, we ￿nd that initial mortgage rates in the subprime market were
signi￿cantly higher than prime mortgage rates. While this is true for interest rates on
1This is despite the fact that around 60-75 percent of FRMs and around 70-85 percent of ARMs
include prepayment penalties. For more details on prepayment penalties, see discussion in Section 4.
2￿xed-rate mortgages (FRMs), it is also true, contrary to popular belief, on teaser rates
of hybrid adjustable rate mortgages (hybrid ARMs). Consequently, there is a higher
probability that subprime borrowers face ￿nancial distress, increasing their propensity to
re￿nance.
However, lower interest rates have not always been the motivation behind prepay-
ments (re￿nances) in the subprime market. The case in point being mortgage originations
of 2003, which have the highest prepayment rate for hybrid-ARM products. As much as
83 percent of hybrid-ARM products (about 64 percent of total) that were originated in
2003, were prepaid by the end of 2006. This seems to suggest that the ￿low-interest-rate
environment￿around 2003-2004 did not play a large role in the prepayment behavior of
subprime mortgages.
Nevertheless, our results support the hypothesis that subprime mortgages were unique
in that prepayments were integral part of the mortgage design (Gorton, 2008). This
is particularly true in the case of hybrid-ARMs which comprise the majority of sub-
prime mortgages of recent vintages. Gorton (2008) argues that lenders avoided exposing
themselves to long-term contracts (like thirty year mortgages) with high-risk subprime
borrowers by placing terms and conditions on the loan that would ideally ￿force￿the
borrower to ￿return￿to the lender at shorter intervals. Essentially, the claim is that
the fully-indexed rate upon reset from the teaser rate was designed to be prohibitively
high so that the borrower had little choice but to return to the lender and re￿nance the
loan. In summary, our results show that prepayment rates on subprime mortgages were
extremely high (i) not just for ARMs but FRMs as well, (ii) even before the reset dates
on hybrid-ARMs and (iii) despite prepayment penalties on the contract.
What sustained high prepayment rates on subprime mortgages? We use a competing-
risk hazard model to demonstrate how the evolution of house prices helped in sustaining
the boom and subsequently led to the downturn in the subprime mortgage market. As is
3well known, there was a strong and persistent appreciation in house prices in almost all
US metropolitan areas from 1995 to 2006, followed by a sharp downturn (see Figure 1).2
We estimate that an increase in house prices has a positive e⁄ect on the likelihood of
prepayment for ￿rst-lien subprime mortgages. At the same time, this increase in house
prices also reduces the likelihood that the borrower defaults on the loan. In a regime of
rising house prices, borrowers can avoid default by prepaying their loans (either through
a re￿nance or a property sale). Moreover, if the house price appreciation is su¢ ciently
large, a borrower can recover the costs of re￿nancing and even choose to extract equity.
However, this option is no longer available when prices do not appreciate. Consequently,
borrower defaults began to increase in 2006, when house prices ceased to appreciate.
The subject of mortgage termination through prepayment (re￿nance) and its relation
to house price appreciation has been discussed before in di⁄erent contexts. Increased
￿nancial awareness, in addition to lender competition, ￿nancial innovations and struc-
tural changes in the mortgage market have signi￿cantly increased a household￿ s ability
to re￿nance a mortgage at very low costs (Bennett, Peach and Persitiani, 2001). Using
PSID household survey data between 1991 and 1996, Hurst and Sta⁄ord (2003) show
that families experiencing a negative income shock or those that are severely liquidity
constrained, are 25 percent more likely to re￿nance than otherwise similar households.
Moreover, there is increasing evidence that some households re￿nance even in times of
rising interest rates, primarily with the motive of consumption-smoothing (Stanton, 1995;
Agarwal, Driscoll and Laibson, 2002). Finally, a decrease in property values makes it
di¢ cult for households to re￿nance mortgages and take advantage of declining interest
rates (Caplin, Freeman and Tracy, 1997).
Putting the pieces together, we sketch the intuition behind our results as follows. Ris-
ing house prices and declining re￿nancing costs over the last two decades have facilitated
2The date for the peak on housing prices and the extent of the fall in home prices varies depending
on the home-price index used. See Aubuchon and Wheelock (2008) for a discussion on the di⁄erences
between the indices.
4a household￿ s propensity to re￿nance a mortgage. This propensity has been shown to be
higher for borrowers that are ￿nancially distressed due to a job loss or medical expenses.
Moreover, this consumption smoothing motivation can be su¢ ciently strong so that bor-
rowers are known to re￿nance even in periods of rising interest rates, merely to extract
equity from their homes (which might explain the high prepayment rates on subprime
originations of 2003). It is fair to claim that while motivations for a cash-out re￿nance
exist for a typical prime borrower, these incentives are likely to be much stronger for
subprime borrowers. Evidently, re￿nancing mortgages during a period of declining inter-
est rates and rising house prices can be easier than doing the same when the opposite is
true.
The dominant explanation for the subprime crisis is that a severe weakening in under-
writing standards occurred over the last few of years, which eventually caused a downturn
in this market. In a companion paper, we examine underwriting standards (Bhardwaj
and Sengupta, 2008), showing that lending standards did not deteriorate within the
subprime market. However, the growth of the subprime segment obviously implies a
weakening of borrower quality in the overall mortgage market. Our explanation for the
subprime crisis is best summarized in Shiller (2008, p.50):
Adjustable-rate mortgages were common because those who had been in￿ u-
enced by bubble thinking and wanted to get into real estate investments as heavily
as possible were demanding them. The mere fact that interest payments would be
going up soon did not deter them. They expected to be compensated by rapidly
increasing home prices, and they believed that those higher prices would permit
them to re￿nance at a lower rate.
Section 2 reviews the literature while Section 3 provides the summary statistics on
default and prepayments in the mortgage market. In Section 4, we discuss how subprime
5mortgage contracts were unique in their design in that they relied heavily on prepayments.
Section 5 provides estimation results and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Economics of Subprime Prepayments
Mortgage prepayment can occur by re￿nancing or a property sale. Because the consider-
ations for property sale under ￿nancial distress are better understood, we will focus our
attention on mortgage re￿nance. Mortgage re￿nancing refers to the prepayment of an
existing mortgage by replacing it with another mortgage, typically under more favorable
terms. Re￿nancing can be undertaken to reduce the interest burden (monthly payments)
on the mortgage (either by re￿nancing to a lower interest rate or by switching to a longer-
term loan), to switch from one product type to another (like switching from an ARM to
FRM), and to extract homeowner￿ s equity (also known as cash out re￿nancing).
The literature on mortgage re￿nancing has highlighted two principal reasons why
households choose to re￿nance.3 The ￿rst occurs when a household re￿nances by taking
advantage of declining interest rates, and is often referred to as a rate re￿nance. The
borrower re￿nances into a stream of lower mortgage payments by paying o⁄ the exist-
ing higher interest mortgage and replacing it with one at the current (lower) interest
rate. In addition, a household may also re￿nance so as to extract accumulated equity
in their home, also known as a cash-out re￿nance. This second motivation is typically
consumption-smoothing and is particularly relevant during a period of house price ap-
preciation.
Evidently, the two motives for re￿nancing are not mutually exclusive and, as Ben-
nett, Peach and Persitiani (2001) observe, re￿nancing in the prime housing market in the
US has occurred in waves during periods of declining long-term interest rates and rising
3Using PSID Survey data, Hurst and Sta⁄ord (2003) ￿nd that those who re￿nance tend to have lower
age, higher education, more income, and are more likely to be married.
6house prices. On the other hand, there is evidence of households re￿nancing even when
the current market rate is higher than the existing contract rate (Stanton, 1995; Agar-
wal, Driscoll and Laibson, 2002). The consumption smoothing motivation that drives
this anomalous behavior is particularly strong for households that experience a negative
income shock (Hurst and Sta⁄ord, 2003). This study also ￿nds that liquidity-constrained
households exhibit a higher propensity to convert home equity into current consumption
than non-liquidity-constrained re￿nancers. In summary, not all re￿nancing behavior in
the current housing market can be explained by current and expected future interest rate
movements.
Evidently, not all households that are liquidity constrained and have an incentive to
re￿nance their existing mortgages are able to do so. Re￿nancing involves transactions
costs that are re￿ ected in points and fees, legal expenses, mortgage insurance premiums
and additional out-of-pocket expenses. Additionally, each of these items varies with prop-
erty, loan and borrower characteristics. For example, in regions su⁄ering from adverse
economic conditions, mortgage re￿nancing is constrained not only by depressed incomes
and damaged credit pro￿les of borrowers but also by declining property values (Caplin,
Freeman and Tracy, 1997).
Finally, mortgage underwriting in the United States has undergone a fundamental
change over the last three decades and is now more closely integrated with the capital
market. Financial innovations, technological advances, along with increased lender com-
petition during this period have greatly reduced the transactions cost associated with
mortgage re￿nancing (Bennett, Peach and Persitiani, 2001). Figure 2 illustrates the
decline in one component of transactions cost, namely points and fees levied as a pro-
portion of the conventional loan amount.4 These costs declined from 2.5 percent in 1983
to roughly 0.4 percent in 2006. Bennett, Peach and Persitiani (2001) argue that such
4We use fees and points from the Freddie Mac PMM Survey, the most commonly available series for
prime borrowers. To the best of our knowledge, we are yet to come across a data series on fees and
points in the subprime mortgage market.
7changes have resulted in a secular increase in prepayment speeds of all mortgage products
in recent years. As a result, lenders now try to avoid prepayment risk by including a
prepayment penalty. Borrowers typically are o⁄ered a lower interest rate in exchange for
accepting a prepayment penalty.
The literature on mortgage re￿nance has mostly concentrated on the prime market.
This is important because the 2001 Residential Finance Survey, the latest conducted
by the Census Bureau, suggests di⁄erences in the motivation to re￿nance between bor-
rowers in prime and subprime markets. Among prime re￿nances, 66 percent were rate
re￿nances while only 26 percent extracted equity. On the other hand, 40 percent of sub-
prime re￿nances included a lower rate but almost half of the sample extracted equity.
Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006) con￿rm that a higher proportion of sub-
prime re￿nances take cash out than prime re￿nances. While they examined re￿nancing in
the early years of the subprime market, little work has been done for the years 2002-2006
when the subprime activity was at its peak.
Cutts and Van Order (2005) ￿nd that while prepayment speeds for the subprime
market are higher on average than those for the prime market, they are relatively less
sensitive to cyclical movements in the interest rate. They document that unlike the
prime market, borrowers in the subprime market have a strong incentive to re￿nance
when their credit scores improve. This distinction often prompts lenders to safeguard
against prepayment risk in the subprime market. Consequently subprime loans are more
than three times as likely to have prepayment penalty terms, with lockouts usually in
e⁄ect for two to ￿ve years.
83 Data and Summary Statistics
Our data source is the ABS (Alt-A & Nonprime) Database from First American Loan
Performance (hereafter, FALP).5 For the purposes of this study, we restrict our analysis
to ￿rst-lien, subprime mortgages.6 Not only does this database report borrower and loan
characteristics at the time of origination, but it also provides updates on the current
status of the mortgage. Our data is current up to June, 2008. However, an important
limitation of this database is that while it records that a mortgage has been paid o⁄; it
does not report if this payment was through a re￿nance of the mortgage or if the property
was sold. For the purposes of this paper, we de￿ne default and prepayment as follows.
A mortgage is in default if it were delinquent for 90 days, or in foreclosure, or real-estate
owned. Finally, all mortgages that were paid o⁄ before they ever registered a 90-day
delinquency are de￿ned to be prepaid.
Table 1 summarizes prepayment behavior in the subprime mortgage market. The
numbers denote the fractions of total loans by product type, that were prepaid within
a given calendar year from the year of origination.7 We consider three major product
types on subprime loans, namely, FRM, ARM2 and ARM3.8 The period of study in each
case is from the time of origination to the end of a calendar year.9 Thus, for example,
5Details on this database, its evolution and coverage are available in Chomsisengphet and Pennington-
Cross (2006) and Mayer and Pence (2008).
6We classify a loan as a subprime loan if it belongs to a subprime pool in the FALP database. Loosely
speaking, subprime pools include loans to borrowers with incomplete or impaired credit histories while
Alt-A pools include loans to borrowers who generally have high credit scores but who are unable or
unwilling to document a stable income history or are buying second home or investment properties
(Fabozzi 2000, p.9).
7For a distribution of subprime mortgages by product types and year of origination, see Table 1 in
Bhardwaj and Sengupta (2008).
8For Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs), the majority of loans are hybrid-ARM, where the initial
teaser rate is often ￿xed for periods of 2, 3 and even 5 years. To simplify classi￿cation over a very broad
range of product types in the market, we de￿ne these products as ARM2, ARM3 and ARM5 respectively.
Thus, ARM2 includes the hybrid 2/28 while ARM3 includes the hybrid 3/27 mortgage. However, not
all ARM2 and ARM3 are 30-year mortgages.
9Our choice of calendar year over the more conventional method of presenting the distribution by
loan age is motivated by much of the commentary on this market arguing that things started worsening
after a calendar date.
938 percent of all FRM loans originated in 1998 were prepaid by the end of 2001. Three
trends are immediately obvious from the data. First, the prepayment rates for ARMs
are higher than those for FRMs of the same vintage. Second, for mortgages originated
between 1998 and 2003, the prepayment rates continue to increase progressively over
time. This is true across all product types. Third, for mortgages originated after 2003,
there has been a decline in the prepayment rates, and this has been particularly severe
for the years 2006 and 2007.
To provide a more detailed picture of these trends, we examine the following loan
status variables over time: delinquency, prepayment and foreclosure. For each vintage
(year of origination), we record loans that experience either a 30-day or a 60-day delin-
quency (as a fraction of total originations) separately. Among these delinquent loans,
we tabulate those that were prepaid and those that went into foreclosure. We do this
separately for loans that experience a 30-day and a 60-day delinquency. The summary
statistics are reported in Tables 2-5 for di⁄erent classi￿cations like occupancy, product
type and purpose of loan.
Table 2 provides the details in trends for delinquency, prepayment and foreclosure on
owner-occupied households. Each panel presents the cumulative percentages for the loans
from the year of origination up to the end of the second, third and fourth calendar year
after the year of origination. For example, 31 percent of owner-occupied originations in
2003 were 30-day delinquent at least once by the end of 2006. Among those experiencing
a 30-day delinquency, 53 percent had been prepaid and 15 percent foreclosed by the end
of 2006.
Tables 3-5 present summary data from the year of origination up to the end of two cal-
endar years.10 The following patterns emerge from a cursory inspection of the summary
10This allows us to compare across loans of all vintages, especially those originated in 2004-2006. The
numbers for 2007, although stated, are not comparable since there is one and a half calendar years of
data available since origination.
10data.
1. Loans that register a 30-day delinquency are more likely to prepay than loans that
record a 60-day delinquency in the same period.
2. Both 30-day and 60-day delinquencies are signi￿cantly higher for loans originated
after 2004.
3. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is sharp decline in prepayment rates
for loans originated after 2004.
Most important, Tables 3-5 show that these ￿ndings are robust across variations
in ownership patterns (occupancy), product type and loan purpose. It is important to
clarify some doubts that may arise. Since our data is current up to June 2008, the data on
originations of 2007 are not strictly comparable with the rest of the vintages. However,
even with one and a half years of data, the prepayment numbers do seem low when
compared to those of earlier vintages. Also, for mortgages that included prepayment
penalties, these penalties were in e⁄ect for originations of all vintages (not just 2006 and
2007 vintages) because we consider data for the ￿rst two calendar years from the year
of origination. Therefore, the anomalous prepayment behavior for originations of 2006
and 2007 vintages is indeed striking.
In summary, this section has demonstrated the importance of prepayments in sub-
prime mortgages. Of course, this raises the obvious questions stated previously. First,
why were prepayment rates so high for subprime mortgages? Second, what sustained
such high prepayment rates in the subprime market? The following sections answer
these questions.
114 The Uniqueness of Subprime Mortgage Design
Why were repayment rates so high for subprime mortgages? Our answer builds on
Gorton￿ s (2008) hypothesis that the high prepayment rates were largely due to the unique
way in which subprime mortgages were designed. Gorton argues that lenders avoided
exposing themselves to long-term contracts (like thirty year mortgages) because of the
high risk pro￿le of subprime borrowers. They did this by placing terms and conditions
on the loan that would ideally ￿force￿the borrower to ￿return￿to the lender at shorter
intervals. This is best illustrated in terms of the hybrid-ARMs, the most common product
type in subprime markets. In a nutshell, the theory claims that the fully-indexed rate
that the borrower was required to pay upon reset from the teaser rate was designed to be
prohibitively high so that the borrower had little choice but to return to the lender and
re￿nance the loan. This gives the lender the desired option to re￿nance or to foreclose
on the property at the shorter length.
Of course, this theory raises serious questions as to the viability of such mortgage
design, not to mention the short-sightedness of a borrower to enter into such a contract.
However, given the evidence on subprime contracts, this is the most plausible explanation
available to us. One explanation here is that these products were orginally intended as
￿bridge-￿nancing￿for ￿nancially distressed borrowers:
These products originally were extended to customers primarily as a temporary
credit accommodation in anticipation of early sale of the property or in expectation
of future earnings growth. However, these loans have more recently been o⁄ered to
subprime borrowers as ￿credit repair￿or ￿a⁄ordability￿products. The Agencies
are concerned that many subprime borrowers may not have su¢ cient ￿nancial
capacity to service a higher debt load, especially if they were quali￿ed based on a
low introductory payment.11
11Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2007).
12Importantly, subsequent legislation has made it mandatory that the borrower￿ s re-
payment ability should be judged by his ability to pay the fully indexed rate and not the
teaser:
For all nontraditional mortgage loan products, an institution￿ s analysis of a
borrower￿ s repayment capacity should include an evaluation of their ability to repay
the debt by ￿nal maturity at the fully indexed rate, assuming a fully amortizing
repayment.12
In this section we provide some empirical evidence in support of this theory. Table
6 shows the terms on the interest rates on subprime mortgage contracts at the time of
loan origination. The ￿rst and second columns give us the unconditional means of the
closing rate on ARM and FRM products respectively. Note that the closing rate on the
ARM is typically the teaser rate in the case of the hybrid-ARM. This teaser rate resets
into the fully-indexed rate which is the sum of the index (typically a market-traded rate
like the LIBOR) and the margin. The third column gives us the mean on margins for
loans of a given vintage, which on average has been a little more than six percent for
such loans. The fourth and ￿fth columns give us the means of the minimum and the
maximum interest rates that could be charged on subprime mortgages over the lifetime of
these contracts. The last column indicates that for an overwhelming majority of subprime
loans, the closing teaser rate was the lifetime minimum that would be charged on such
mortgages.
Table 6 shows the essentials behind the design on subprime mortgages. First, the
popular notion that teaser rates were very low is largely untrue. Second, the sum of the
margin and the lifetime minimum is on average not much lower than lifetime maximum
on the loan. Clearly, the interest rates were anticipated to be extremely high on reset.
12Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2006).
13Gorton (2008) argues that such high rates were designed to ￿force￿the subprime bor-
rower to prepay the loan.13 If the contract terms were settled at origination, why did
the borrower not re￿nance the loan before the reset date? Gorton argues that subprime
lenders prevented this eventuality by the inclusion of prepayment penalties in the con-
tract. Several studies have noted that a higher proportion of subprime loans included
prepayment penalties when compared with prime loans (Cutts and van Order, 2005,
Gorton, 2008).
Table 7 provides the timeline on prepayment dates and rate resets. Column (2) shows
that roughly 70-80 percent of hybrid ARMs had prepayment penalties. Fortunately,
our data provide information on the penalty term (the number of months after which
the borrower could prepay the mortgage without incurring the penalty). If Gorton￿ s
hypothesis of prepayment penalties on hybrid-ARMs is true, then for a majority of these
loans the prepayment term should not expire before the rest date. Indeed, that is exactly
what we ￿nd for over 90 percent of such loans (Columns (5)-(6)). Interestingly, the
prepayment term ends at the reset date for a majority of loans and this proportion seems
to be increasing over the years (Column 5). For loans in which the prepayment term
expires before the reset date, the length of the term (in months) is on average half of
duration for which the teaser rate is in e⁄ect (Column 4). Conversely, for loans in which
the prepayment term is longer, it is on an average at least 1.5 times lengthier (Column
7).
The results in Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate the uniqueness of subprime mortgages. In
summary, they support the hypothesis that is formalized in Gorton (2008). The majority
of subprime mortgage contracts were hybrid-ARMs, featuring teaser rates, margins, reset
dates and prepayment penalties. The overwhelming majority of these contracts rest into
prohibitively high rates leaving the borrower little option but to prepay either by selling
13It is not altogether clear if the borrowers were short-sighted or they were misled into such contracts.
While it is not possible to rule this out, it is important to note that millions of such mortgages were
originated in the subprime market.
14or by re￿nancing. In summary, our results show that prepayment rates on subprime
mortgages were extremely high (i) not just for ARMs but FRMs as well, (ii) even before
the reset dates on hybrid-ARMs and (iii) despite prepayment penalties on the contract.
While these data show that prepayments were so high in the subprime market, it also
leads us to our next question: What sustained such high prepayment rates?
5 Results
In this section, we attempt to answer as to what sustained high prepayment rates. Our
question could be stated di⁄erently: why didn￿ t these mortgages go into default or foreclo-
sure? To help answer this question we model how mortgage repayment behavior switches
between prepayment and default. As explained previously, prepayments and defaults are
in the set of alternatives available to the borrower in repaying the loan and therefore we
need to look at them in tandem. There is however a third alternative: stay current (or
maintain the current delinquency status) by paying the monthly installment on the loan.
Since prepayment and default are substitutes, we jointly model the competing risks
of default and prepayment. To this end, we estimate a competing risk hazard model for
the events of prepayment and default. A loan is considered prepaid if it was paid o⁄
before the borrower recorded a 90-day delinquency. On the other hand, a mortgage is
considered to be in default if the loan records a 90-day delinquency or foreclosure. We
look at what considerations prompted a borrower to prepay or default.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the Kaplan-Meier default and prepayment probabilities. The two
plots are not mirror images of each other because, as mentioned before, there is a third
option for the borrowers to stay current (or delinquent). As seen in Figure 3, with the
exception of originations in 2003, default probabilities increased progressively for each
year in the sample period. However, the default probabilities rise sharply for originations
15of 2004-2007. Much of the commentary on the subprime crisis has sought to explain
this trend. What has been omitted from these commentaries is that, during the same
period (2004-2007), every vintage shows a progressively lower prepayment probability
rate than earlier vintages for the same age on the loan (Figure 4). Stated di⁄erently,
prepayment probabilities fall sharply for originations of 2004-2007. After two calendar
years, the prepayment probabilities were 0.44, 0.46 and 0.45 for mortgage originations
of 2002, 2003 and 2004 vintages. However, the prepayment probability on originations
of 2005 and 2006 vintages are 0.36 and 0.23 respectively (note that this includes their
performance during the calendar years 2006 and 2007). Furthermore, mortgages of 2003
and 2004 vintages have very similar prepayment probabilities, though for the ￿rst 24
months the prepayment probability for 2003 vintages is slightly lower then that of 2004,
which could be attributed to historically low interest rates during 2003.
To formalize our argument, we split borrower repayment behavior into three possible
outcomes: (1) the borrower defaults on the loan, (2) borrower prepays and (3) the loan
is current or even 30-day or 60-day delinquent. We denote the exit routes by event j,
where the three events are given by subscript j = 1;2;3. Let Tij be the age (in months)
at which borrower i chooses event j. Therefore, the loan performance of borrower i is
observed for minj (Tij). The hazard function hij(t) speci￿es the instantaneous probability
of occurrence of event j (1;2) for mortgage i, and is given by
hij(t) = lim
￿t!0
Pr(t ￿ Tij < t + ￿tjTij ￿ t)
￿t
(1)
Then, following Cox (1972) the semi parametric representation that we estimate takes
the form
hij(t) = h0j(t)exp(Xi￿j) (2)
where h0j(t) is the cumulative baseline hazard rate for event j (1;2) and Xi is the vector
of covariates on mortgage i.
16For estimating both equations we control for characteristics of the borrower, lender,
property as well as some loan characteristics. The borrower characteristics that we control
for include credit score14 and occupancy (dummies for owner-occupied, investor-owned
or second home), while lender characteristics include the type of lender or loan source
(like retail, broker, realtor, etc.). Property characteristics include the number of units,
property type (condo, townhouse etc.), location (dummy for each state in which the
property is located), and home value quartile to which the property belongs. Finally,
loan characteristics include loan type (conventional, VA, FHA, government, etc.), loan
purpose (purchase, cash-out re￿nance, no cash-out re￿nance etc.), loan documentation
(high doc or low-doc), prepayment penalty and term of prepayment. In addition, we
also include two dummies. The ￿rst takes the value one if the term (in months) of the
prepayment penalty is greater than the term of reset for ARMs and zero otherwise. The
second takes the value one if the date on the event (prepayment or default) is greater
than the term of reset for ARMs.
In addition, we include several variables that control for market conditions between
the time of orgination and at the time of prepayment or default. Fees and Points are
the fees and discount points charged by the lender at settlement. As is common in
this literature, we use the Principal/Value (PV ) variable as measure of the incentive
to undertake a rate re￿nance (Richard and Roll, 1989). PVt measures the ratio of the
present value of the payments on mortgage principal outstanding at time t using the





1 ￿ (1 + r0)t￿M
1 ￿ (1 + rt)t￿M
￿
where rt and r0 are the current and existing rates on the mortgage and M is the maturity
period in number of months (360 months for a 30-year mortgage). Note that if rt = r0,
14The credit score is normalized by dividing borrower￿ s FICO score by 100.
17PVt = 1. There is an incentive to re￿nance if rt < r0, that is if PVt < 1. De￿ning rt
and r0 to be the 6-month LIBOR at the time of the event and the time of origination,
we create the variable PV Annualized rate.
Kau et al (1993) suggest that interest rate volatility reduces the probability of pre-
payment. Following Ambrose and Sanders (2003), we de￿ne the variable as the standard
deviation of the six-month LIBOR for the previous 24 months. Furthermore, as argued
above, house price appreciation is critical for the decision to re￿nance. We tabulate
House Price Growth as the appreciation of the repeat-sales OFHEO house price index
at the MSA level. Finally, to control for negative income shocks we use Unemployment
Rate which is the monthly series for total non-farm unemployment rate at the MSA level
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
A question of added interest here is: What determines the age at which loans are
prepaid? To answer this question we use a two-step Heckman correction regression where
the selection equation (decision to prepay) is a probit. The regression results are provided
in Tables 8-16. Tables 8-13 provide the results of the competing risk hazard models of
prepayment and default for each product type: FRM, ARM2 and ARM3. In Tables 14-
16, we provide the results for the treatment equation in the Heckman two-step regression
on determinants of loan age at prepayment for each of the three product types.
Tables 8-9 reports the hazard ratios for the competing-risk hazard rate regressions for
FRMs. The regressions are conducted for all loans originated in a given calendar year.15
A hazard rate that is greater than unity implies an increase in the probability of the
event and vice-versa. The results seem to con￿rm our somewhat ad hoc beliefs about
how borrower characteristics determine repayment behavior. For example, a hundred-
point increase in FICO scores on mortgage originations of 2002, increases the prepayment
probability by 15.64 percent but reduces the default probability by 46.58 percent. Like-
15We omit loans originated in 2007 because we have just over a year and a half of payment data for
loans of this vintage
18wise, full documentation (as opposed to low or no documentation) on an origination of
2002 increases the probability of prepayment by 3.3 percent but reduces the probability
of default by 17.94 percent.
Our main result comes from the hazard ratios on the House Price Growth variable.
For the FRMs originated in 2004, the hazard rate on the House Price Growth variable
is 1.16 for prepayment but 0.76 for default. This implies that, for mortgages of 2004
vintage, a one percent per annum increase in house prices increases the probability of
prepayment by 16 percent but reduces the probability of default by 24 percent. This result
is extremely robust. Moreover, this ratio is economically and statistically signi￿cant for
both the prepayment and default regression. Furthermore, the result holds true for all
vintages and across each of the three product types.
Next, we expect Fees and Points and Prepayment Penalties to reduce the probability
of prepayment and thereby increase the probability of default. For Fees and Points, we
￿nd that it marginally increases the probability of both prepayment and default. Our
results reveal that the use of fees and points from the Freddie Mac PMM Survey (￿gure 2)
on prime mortgages might be an imperfect proxy for the fees and points on the subprime
market. For our data on Prepayment Penalties, the results are just as we would expect:
the inclusion of such penalties reduces the likelihood of prepayment and increases the
likelihood of default.
As for macroeconomic variables, the Interest Volatility and PV Annualized Rate vari-
ables have a signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect on the likelihood of default and prepayment.
The result is not in line with our expectations. Ideally, Interest Volatility should reduce
the likelihood of prepayment but our results show the opposite. However, the magnitude
of the hazard ratio is not economically signi￿cant. As mentioned earlier, an increase in
the PV Annualized Rate should reduce the incentive to re￿nance. Again, we ￿nd the
opposite in our results, but the magnitude of this variable￿ s e⁄ect on the hazard ratio
19appears not to be signi￿cant for most vintages. From our results, we get that Unemploy-
ment Rate increases the probability of prepayment (as homeowners cash-out the bene￿t
from the appreciation in home prices) and default (only for later vintages) as one would
expect.
Before concluding this section, we discuss the results on the determinants of loan
age on re￿nance. Again the results are given by loan vintage. The coe¢ cients on the
second stage treatment equation for each product type are reported in Tables 14-16.
For mortgages of the given vintage, a negative coe¢ cient implies that borrowers are
more likely to prepay sooner than later. For House Price Growth, this coe¢ cient is
positive for mortgages of earlier vintage but turns negative for mortgages of later vintages.
This points to an interesting phenomenon witnessed in these markets. A house price
appreciation on earlier mortgages delayed prepayment whereas the similar appreciation
on mortgages of later vintages rushed prepayment. It somewhat embellishes the earlier
result and our hypothesis regarding the downturn in this market: borrowers on more
recent mortgages are keener to prepay on house price appreciation than those who took
out subprime loans earlier.
In summary, the results underlie the importance of house prices in this market. First, a
rise in house price increased the probability of prepayment while reducing the probability
of default. Second, a house price appreciation on mortgages of earlier vintage delayed
prepayment whereas the similar appreciation on mortgages of later vintages increased
prepayment speeds. Taken together, the robustness of these results point to the fact that
the boom in house prices for the most part of the sample period was largely responsible
for sustaining the subprime mortgage market by allowing distressed borrowers to prepay
mortgages.
206 Conclusion
We conclude that the story of the subprime mortgage crisis is a story of mortgage prepay-
ments. The highest prepayment rate is for adjustable rate mortgages originated in 2003.
This is surprising given that interest rates were considerably low in 2003. Consequently,
it is di¢ cult to argue that borrowers in mortgages of this vintage were able re￿nance at
lower rates in subsequent years. And yet, as much as 83 percent of loans in this category
were prepaid by the end of 2007. Therefore, it is likely that most prepayments on these
loans would include cash-out re￿nances or property sales.
Against this background are the steep rise in house prices over the same period in
some US metropolitan areas (see Figure 1). In this period, house price indices increased
more then ten percent per year in several states, mostly in the coastal states of California,
Florida, Nevada, Maryland and Rhode Island. However, the rise in house prices has been
very uneven across the nation, with some states, like Texas and Ohio, growing barely
above two percent per year. The increase in house prices is substantial even if one looks at
the average state-level price, which smoothens out di⁄erences across local markets within
each state. As Case and Shiller (2003) note, US house prices have been rising faster than
incomes and faster than other prices in virtually every metropolitan area. Contrary to
most theoretical predictions, the house prices did not turn down and the housing boom
continued unabated despite the recession in 2001 (Mayer and Quigley, 2003).
At this point it is important to note that our explanation treats the widespread
appreciation of home prices in the US as exogenous. In this regard, we are motivated
largely by Shiller (2008), who argues that the ￿most important single element￿in the
house price boom is, as he puts it, ￿the social contagion of boom thinking.￿He argues
(p.48):
Other factors are widely cited as the cause of the housing boom.... to a large
21extent, these other factors are themselves substantially a product of the bubble,
and not exogenous factors that caused the bubble.
Our results show that this sharp and persistent increase in house prices in almost all
metropolitan areas since 1995 is critical. We estimate that an increase in house prices
has a positive e⁄ect on the likelihood of prepayment for ￿rst-lien subprime mortgages.
Concomitantly, this increase in house prices also reduces the likelihood that the borrower
defaults on the loan. In a regime of rising house prices, a ￿nancially distressed borrower
can avoid default by prepaying the loan (either through a re￿nance or a property sale).
Moreover, if the house price appreciation is su¢ ciently large, the borrower can recover
the costs of re￿nancing and even choose to extract equity. However, this option is no
longer available when prices cease to appreciate. Consequently, borrower defaults began
to increase once house prices failed to appreciate in 2006.
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Figure 1: Evolution of House Prices 1992-2007 
(year on year change)
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  25Figure 2: Fees and Points on 30-yr Fixed Rate Mortgages
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Table 1. Prepayment Rates by Mortgage Product Type  
The numbers in the table denote the fraction of total loans by product type that were paid off before they become seriously delinquent. The loans are 
organized by year of origination and the period of study for each loan extends to the end of the calendar year. The data is available till June 2008. 
            
Year  of  mortgage  origination      1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Fixed            
Up to 1 calendar year  0.03  0.04  0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 
Up to 2 calendar years  0.14  0.14 0.24 0.31 0.39 0.36 0.32 0.24 0.16   
Up to 3 calendar years  0.23  0.28 0.40 0.50 0.55 0.51 0.42 0.30     
Up to 4 calendar years  0.38  0.44 0.52 0.61 0.65 0.59 0.48       
Up to 5 calendar years  0.50  0.55  0.60  0.68  0.70  0.63         
            
ARM2            
Up to 1 calendar year  0.04  0.05  0.07 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.07 
Up to 2 calendar years  0.23  0.23 0.31 0.37 0.43 0.49 0.47 0.36 0.21   
Up to 3 calendar years  0.58  0.51 0.57 0.64 0.71 0.77 0.75 0.56     
Up to 4 calendar years  0.68  0.63 0.67 0.73 0.78 0.82 0.78       
Up to 5 calendar years  0.72  0.70  0.72  0.76  0.80  0.83         
            
ARM3            
Up to 1 calendar year  0.05  0.05  0.06 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.07 
Up to 2 calendar years  0.18  0.23 0.29 0.34 0.41 0.46 0.47 0.36 0.21   
Up to 3 calendar years  0.33  0.41 0.47 0.54 0.58 0.62 0.61 0.45     
Up to 4 calendar years  0.51  0.57 0.63 0.70 0.75 0.79 0.74       
Up to 5 calendar years  0.59  0.64  0.69  0.74  0.79  0.82         
                                




  29Table 2. Repayment Behavior of Owner Occupied Households (up to four years after 
origination). 
Delinquency rates is based on percentage of total loans in the sample. We consider both loans that are both 30-day and 
60-day delinquent. Among the loans that are delinquent, we consider those that were prepaid and those that went into 
foreclosure. We do this separately for loans that were 30-day and 60-day delinquent. The second panel is prepayment 
rate, the number of loans prepaid expressed as percentage of loans that are delinquent in each category. The third panel is 
the foreclosure rate, the number of loans foreclosed expressed as percentage of loans that are delinquent in each 
category. 
 
Panel A. Delinquency Rate  
(% of total loans) 
           
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Vintage  After 2  years  After 3 years  After 4 years  After 2  years  After 3 years  After 4 years 
1998  21% 28% 32%  8%  12%  14% 
1999  26% 33% 37%  10%  14%  17% 
2000  31% 37% 40%  13%  17%  20% 
2001  33% 39% 41%  13%  18%  20% 
2002  33% 37% 39%  13%  17%  19% 
2003  27% 31% 32%  11%  14%  15% 
2004  29% 33% 35%  13%  17%  19% 
2005  34% 42%    19%  28%   
2006  46%     34%     
2007*  40%     30%     
          
Panel B. Prepayment Rate for delinquent loans 
(% of delinquent loans) 
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Vintage  After 2  years  After 3 years  After 4 years  After 2  years  After 3 years  After 4 years 
1998  22% 36% 45%  13%  21%  26% 
1999  22% 36% 46%  13%  20%  26% 
2000  24% 39% 49%  13%  20%  26% 
2001  26% 44% 54%  15%  24%  30% 
2002  32% 51% 60%  18%  28%  35% 
2003  35% 53% 60%  20%  30%  35% 
2004  33% 49% 52%  19%  26%  27% 
2005  22% 27%    10%  11%   
2006  9%     3%     
2007*  4%     1%     
          
Panel C. Foreclosure Rate for delinquent loans 
(% of delinquent loans) 
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Vintage  After 2  years  After 3 years  After 4 years  After 2  years  After 3 years  After 4 years 
1998  11% 15% 19%  29%  36%  42% 
1999  11% 16% 19%  29%  39%  42% 
2000  14% 19% 22%  35%  40%  44% 
2001  12% 17% 20%  29%  37%  41% 
2002  11% 16% 19%  29%  36%  39% 
2003  11% 15% 17%  27%  33%  37% 
2004  11% 17% 20%  26%  34%  38% 
2005  17% 28%    30%  42%   
2006  27%     36%     
2007*  19%     25%     
* For 2007 vintage, the data is available for only one calendar year and five months. Source: FALP 
 
  30Table 3. Repayment Behavior by Occupancy: Status for two calendar years after year of 
origination. 
Delinquency rates is based on percentage of total loans in the sample. We consider both loans that are both 30-day and 
60-day delinquent. Among the loans that are delinquent, we consider those that were prepaid and those that went into 
foreclosure. We do this separately for loans that were 30-day and 60-day delinquent. The second panel is prepayment 
rate, the number of loans prepaid expressed as percentage of loans that are delinquent in each category. The third panel is 
the foreclosure rate, the number of loans foreclosed expressed as percentage of loans that are delinquent in each 
category. 
 
Panel A. Delinquency Rate  
(% of total loans) 
          
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Vintage  Owner Occupied  Second Home  Investor Occupied  Owner Occupied  Second Home  Investor Occupied 
1998  21% 7%  22%  8% 3% 10% 
1999  26% 11% 26%  10% 3% 11% 
2000  31% 21% 30%  13% 7% 13% 
2001  33% 24% 32%  13% 8% 13% 
2002  33% 26% 30%  13% 8% 12% 
2003  27% 21% 23%  11% 7% 10% 
2004  29% 23% 26%  13% 9% 13% 
2005  34% 28% 33%  19%  15% 20% 
2006  46% 43% 45%  34%  32% 34% 
2007*  40% 39% 38%  30%  29% 30% 
           
Panel B. Prepayment Rate for delinquent loans 
(% of delinquent loans) 
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Vintage  Owner Occupied  Second Home  Investor Occupied  Owner Occupied  Second Home  Investor Occupied 
1998  22% 23% 17%  13%  18% 10% 
1999  22% 23% 18%  13%  15% 10% 
2000  24% 23% 21%  13%  15% 11% 
2001  26% 28% 23%  15%  20% 14% 
2002  32% 32% 25%  18%  23% 13% 
2003  35% 33% 28%  20%  21% 15% 
2004  33% 32% 28%  19%  19% 14% 
2005  22% 19% 20%  10% 9%  9% 
2006  9% 7% 9%  3%  3% 4% 
2007*  4% 4% 4%  1%  1% 2% 
           
Panel C. Foreclosure Rate for delinquent loans 
(% of delinquent loans) 
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Vintage  Owner Occupied  Second Home  Investor Occupied  Owner Occupied  Second Home  Investor Occupied 
1998  11% 11% 21%  29%  28% 45% 
1999  11% 9% 18%  29%  28%  41% 
2000  14% 10% 18%  35%  32% 40% 
2001  12% 8% 16%  29%  22%  39% 
2002  11% 8% 17%  29%  26%  42% 
2003  11% 9% 17%  27%  24%  42% 
2004  11% 10% 19%  26%  25% 40% 
2005  17% 19% 28%  30%  35% 46% 
2006  27% 32% 37%  36%  44% 49% 
2007*  19% 26% 28%  25%  35% 37% 
* For 2007 vintage, the data is available for only one calendar year and five months. Source: FALP  
 
  31Table 4. Repayment Behavior by Product Type: Status for two calendar years after 
origination. 
Delinquency rates is based on percentage of total loans in the sample. We consider both loans that are both 30-day and 
60-day delinquent. Among the loans that are delinquent, we consider those that were prepaid and those that went into 
foreclosure. We do this separately for loans that were 30-day and 60-day delinquent. The second panel is prepayment 
rate, the number of loans prepaid expressed as percentage of loans that are delinquent in each category. The third panel is 
the foreclosure rate, the number of loans foreclosed expressed as percentage of loans that are delinquent in each 
category. 
 
Panel A. Delinquency Rate  
(% of total loans) 
            
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Vintage  FRM ARM2  ARM3  FRM  ARM2  ARM3 
1998  18% 24%  22%  7% 9% 10% 
1999  22% 30%  32%  8% 11%  13% 
2000  27% 34%  33%  11%  14%  14% 
2001  27% 37%  38%  10%  15%  15% 
2002  25% 36%  38%  9% 14%  15% 
2003  21% 30%  28%  8% 12%  12% 
2004  22% 32%  26%  10%  14%  13% 
2005  27% 37%  31%  14%  21%  19% 
2006  37% 51%  45%  24%  39%  33% 
2007*  34% 44%  39%  24%  35%  29% 
           
Panel B. Prepayment Rate for delinquent loans 
(% of delinquent loans) 
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Vintage  FRM ARM2  ARM3  FRM  ARM2  ARM3 
1998  19% 24%  21%  12%  14%  10% 
1999  19% 23%  23%  12%  14%  14% 
2000  22% 25%  25%  12%  14%  13% 
2001  23% 28%  25%  12%  17%  14% 
2002  29% 33%  30%  15%  19%  16% 
2003  29% 37%  33%  16%  21%  19% 
2004  25% 35%  33%  13%  20%  19% 
2005  17% 23%  21%  8% 11%  10% 
2006  8% 9%  9%  3%  4%  3% 
2007*  4% 4%  4%  1%  1%  1% 
           
Panel C. Foreclosure Rate for delinquent loans 
(% of delinquent loans) 
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Vintage  FRM ARM2  ARM3  FRM  ARM2  ARM3 
1998  11% 10%  12%  29%  28%  28% 
1999  11% 11%  12%  29%  29%  30% 
2000  12% 16%  16%  30%  37%  36% 
2001  11% 12%  13%  29%  30%  32% 
2002  10% 12%  13%  26%  31%  32% 
2003  9% 12%  12% 23%  30%  28% 
2004  8% 13%  13% 18%  29%  25% 
2005  10% 20%  17%  19%  35%  29% 
2006  15% 31%  25%  22%  41%  35% 
2007*  12% 24%  18%  17%  30%  24% 
* For 2007 vintage, the data is available for only one calendar year and five months. Source: FALP  
 
  32Table 5. Repayment Behavior by Loan Purpose: Status for two calendar years after year of 
origination. 
Delinquency rates is based on percentage of total loans in the sample. We consider both loans that are both 30-day and 
60-day delinquent. Among the loans that are delinquent, we consider those that were prepaid and those that went into 
foreclosure. We do this separately for loans that were 30-day and 60-day delinquent. The second panel is prepayment 
rate, the number of loans prepaid expressed as percentage of loans that are delinquent in each category. The third panel is 
the foreclosure rate, the number of loans foreclosed expressed as percentage of loans that are delinquent in each 
category. 
 
Panel A. Delinquency Rate  
(% of total loans) 
           
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Vintage  Purchase  Refinance (Cash Out)  Refinance (No Cash Out)  Purchase  Refinance (Cash Out)  Refinance (No Cash Out) 
1998  21% 21%  23%  8%  8%  9% 
1999  23% 26%  32%  9%  10%  12% 
2000  29% 31%  37%  12% 13%  16% 
2001  33% 33%  37%  14% 13%  16% 
2002  32% 33%  33%  13% 13%  13% 
2003  26% 27%  26%  11% 10%  11% 
2004  28% 29%  29%  13% 12%  13% 
2005  34% 33%  34%  21% 17%  18% 
2006  49% 44%  42%  39% 31%  29% 
2007*  41% 39%  37%  33% 29%  27% 
            
Panel B. Prepayment Rate for delinquent loans 
(% of delinquent loans) 
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Vintage  Purchase  Refinance (Cash Out)  Refinance (No Cash Out)  Purchase  Refinance (Cash Out)  Refinance (No Cash Out) 
1998  20% 21%  25%  11% 13%  16% 
1999  19% 22%  22%  11% 14%  13% 
2000  23% 25%  23%  12% 14%  12% 
2001  22% 28%  26%  12% 16%  15% 
2002  28% 34%  31%  15% 19%  17% 
2003  30% 37%  31%  16% 22%  17% 
2004  28% 36%  28%  15% 21%  15% 
2005  16% 27%  20%  7%  13%  9% 
2006  6% 12%  9%  3%  4%  4% 
2007*  3% 4%  4%  1% 1%  1% 
            
Panel C. Foreclosure Rate for delinquent loans 
(% of delinquent loans) 
  30-day delinquency  60-day delinquency 
Vintage  Purchase  Refinance (Cash Out)  Refinance (No Cash Out)  Purchase  Refinance (Cash Out)  Refinance (No Cash Out) 
1998  13% 13%  10%  32% 32%  26% 
1999  12% 11%  12%  31% 29%  32% 
2000  15% 14%  17%  37% 33%  38% 
2001  14% 11%  13%  33% 28%  29% 
2002  14% 11%  13%  34% 28%  31% 
2003  15% 9%  11%  34% 25%  28% 
2004  16% 10%  11%  33% 23%  24% 
2005  24% 13%  14%  38% 26%  27% 
2006  35% 21%  21%  45% 30%  30% 
2007*  28% 16%  15%  34% 22%  21% 
* For 2007 vintage, the data is available for only one calendar year and five months. Source: FALP   
 
  33Table 6. Interest Rates on Subprime Loans 
The first column gives the mean of the closing interest rate for the mortgage. For hybrid-ARMs this is the teaser rate. The mean (and standard deviations in 
parentheses) of margin on reset, the lifetime maximum and minimum interest rates for ARMs are given in columns 3-5 respectively. The last column gives the 
percent of ARMs for which the closing interest rate is equal to the lifetime minimum interest rate on the loan. 
 
   Close Interest Rate  Margin   Life Time Max  Life Time Min  Closing rate= Min 
 Vintage  Avg. (s.d.)  Avg. (s.d.)  Avg. (s.d.)  Avg. (s.d.)  Percent of ARM 
  FRM  ARM 
9.92 9.92 6.16  16.44  9.65  1998 
(1.6)  (1.22) (0.88) (1.33)  (1.5) 
89.1% 
 
10.15  10.08 6.29 16.46 9.95  1999 
(1.57)  (1.2)  (0.83) (1.37) (1.37) 
94.2% 
 
10.98 10.6  6.2  17.04  10.43  2000 
(1.55) (1.28) (0.92)  (1.5)  (1.63) 
94.7% 
 
9.71 9.68 6.36 16.1  9.5  2001 
(1.65) (1.36) (1.18) (1.46) (1.59) 
91.9% 
 
8.52 8.73 6.63  15.07  8.64  2002 
(1.44) (1.32) (1.32) (1.42) (1.42) 
95.5% 
 
7.49 7.74 6.29  14.07  7.68  2003 
(1.21) (1.22) (1.34)  (1.4)  (1.25) 
96.0% 
 
7.23 7.3  6.1  13.69  7.24  2004 
(1.15) (1.16) (1.11) (1.23) (1.19) 
95.7% 
 
7.43 7.54 5.96  13.86  7.42  2005 
(1.17) (1.15) (1.04) (1.24) (1.25) 
93.2% 
 
8.34 8.49 6.09  14.82  8.25  2006 
(1.3)  (1.15) (0.91) (1.26) (1.41) 
91.1% 
 
8.65 8.6  6 14.94  7.93 
2007 
(1.46) (1.26) (0.79) (1.37) (1.56) 76.8% 
  34Table 7. Prepayment Term and Date of First Reset 
The prepayment term is the duration (in months) for which the prepayment penalty is in effect. The First Reset date is the date at which the hybrid-ARM resets 
from the closing (teaser) interest rate to the fully-indexed interest rate. Columns (1) and (2) give the percent of mortgages by vintage that include a prepayment 
penalty in their contract. Column (3) is the percent of loans with the penalty for which we have data on the prepayment term.   
 





Prepayment Term ends before 
First Reset Date 
Prepayment 
Term ends at 
First Reset 
Date 
Prepayment Term ends after 
First Reset Date 
Vintage      

























  FRM  ARM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
1998  53%  71%  66%  8%  0.49  57%  35%  1.82 
1999  60%  80%  79%  4%  0.47  54%  42%  1.78 
2000  61%  85%  81%  4%  0.49  64%  32%  1.89 
2001  68%  86%  85%  4%  0.49  69%  27%  1.66 
2002  69%  85%  83%  4%  0.48  76%  21%  1.62 
2003  72%  79%  78%  5%  0.47  81%  14%  1.56 
2004  75%  74%  74%  6%  0.47  83%  11%  1.55 
2005  74%  72%  72%  7%  0.49  85%  8%  1.52 
2006  72%  71%  71%  7%  0.50  88%  5%  1.52 
2007  69%  69%  69%  8%  0.50  89%  3%  1.51 
1. Expressed as a proportion of the number of months before the first reset date.   
  35Table 8. Estimated Cox proportional hazard rate regression: Prepayment Hazard Ratios for FRMs 
FICO score is normalized or divided by 100.  Fees and Points are the fees and discount points charged by the lender at settlement on a 30-yr FRM 
prime mortgage, taken from the Freddie Mac PMMS Survey. House Price Growth is the appreciation of the repeat-sales OFHEO house price 
index at the MSA level. Interest Volatility is the standard deviation of the six-month LIBOR for the previous 24 months. PV Annualized Rate 
measures the ratio of the present value of the payments on mortgage principal outstanding using the existing mortgage rate to that using the current 
rate available on refinance. Unemployment Rate is the monthly series for total non-farm unemployment rate at the MSA level from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics at the time of prepayment/default. Home Value nth Quartile is a dummy that equals one if the value of the property lies in the n-th 
quartile of all property values in the data and zero otherwise. 
 
Variable  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FICO (normalized)  1.2616*** 1.2847*** 1.4113*** 1.2486*** 1.1564***  1.12***  1.0863*** 1.1092*** 1.0842*** 
Fees and Points  1.0679*** 1.0636*** 1.0406*** 1.0306*** 1.0178*** 1.0314*** 1.0486*** 1.0021***  0.976*** 
Prepayment Penalty  1.0300  1.089***  0.9458*** 0.9185*** 1.0662*** 0.8535*** 0.8313*** 0.7967*** 0.7273*** 
Full-Doc  1.0676*** 1.0666*** 1.0477*** 1.0334***  1.033***  1.0518*** 1.0247*** 1.0703***  1.0591 
House Price Growth  1.1881*** 1.2307*** 1.0005*** 1.0515*** 1.0843***  1.162***  1.1614***  1.141***  1.1001*** 
Interest Volatility  1.0055*** 1.0078*** 1.0075*** 1.0101*** 1.0038*** 0.9959*** 1.0038*** 1.0238*** 1.0242*** 
PV Annualized Rate  1.0018*** 1.0026*** 1.0017*** 1.0027*** 1.0158*** 1.0333*** 1.0674*** 1.0768*** 1.0473*** 
Unemployment Rate   1.0317***  1.0033  0.9706*** 1.1036*** 1.0816*** 1.0558***  0.9912**  1.0208***  1.0217** 
Home Value First Quartile  0.839***  0.9151*** 0.6676*** 0.6925*** 0.6716*** 0.7206*** 0.7912***  0.7879  0.7965*** 
Home Value Second Quartile  0.9096*** 0.9462*** 0.8012*** 0.8411*** 0.8152*** 0.8304*** 0.8574***  0.9127**  0.9294*** 
Home Value Third Quartile  0.9814  0.9884  0.8947***  0.916***  0.9081*** 0.8804*** 0.9148***  0.9854  0.9963 
           
LR  53930.73 61289.10 33171.88 42962.99 76076.95 220403.07 206758.05  94163.76  13845.02 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
 
  36Table 9. Estimated Cox proportional hazard rate regression: Default Hazard Ratios for FRMs 
FICO score is normalized or divided by 100.  Fees and Points are the fees and discount points charged by the lender at settlement on a 30-yr FRM 
prime mortgage, taken from the Freddie Mac PMMS Survey. House Price Growth is the appreciation of the repeat-sales OFHEO house price 
index at the MSA level. Interest Volatility is the standard deviation of the six-month LIBOR for the previous 24 months. PV Annualized Rate 
measures the ratio of the present value of the payments on mortgage principal outstanding using the existing mortgage rate to that using the current 
rate available on refinance. Unemployment Rate is the monthly series for total non-farm unemployment rate at the MSA level from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics at the time of prepayment/default. Home Value nth Quartile is a dummy that equals one if the value of the property lies in the n-th 
quartile of all property values in the data and zero otherwise.  
 
Variable  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FICO (normalized)  0.5802*** 0.6045*** 0.5397*** 0.5986*** 0.5342*** 0.5671*** 0.5339*** 0.6094*** 0.5913*** 
Fees and Points  1.1179*** 1.1409*** 1.1577*** 1.0949***  1.046***  1.0776*** 1.1277*** 1.0486*** 0.9534*** 
Prepayment Penalty  1.1244  0.95***  1.043***  0.9655*** 1.2844*** 1.2388*** 1.2768*** 1.2975*** 1.8092*** 
Full-Doc  0.9075*** 0.9152***  0.852***  0.881***  0.8206*** 0.7802*** 0.7851*** 0.7478***  0.6652 
House Price Growth  0.5009*** 0.5577*** 0.8511*** 0.5683*** 0.6188*** 0.7214*** 0.7622*** 0.8081*** 0.7883*** 
Interest Volatility  1.0061***  1.013***  1.0184*** 1.0215*** 1.0143***  1.005***  1.0219*** 1.1008*** 1.0606*** 
PV Annualized Rate  1.0012*** 1.0033*** 1.0031*** 1.0028***  1.019***  1.0368***  1.078***  1.1225*** 1.0556*** 
Unemployment Rate   0.7756***  0.8105  0.936***  1.0473*** 1.1156*** 1.1148***  1.085**  1.1073***  0.8853** 
Home Value First Quartile  0.8154*** 0.8276*** 1.0819*** 0.9926*** 0.9711*** 0.9612*** 1.0497***  1.1422  1.083*** 
Home Value Second Quartile  0.7309*** 0.7221*** 0.9464*** 0.8879*** 0.9556*** 0.9394*** 0.9194***  0.9264**  0.9437*** 
Home Value Third Quartile  0.7441  0.7761  0.9378***  0.971***  1.0382*** 0.9826*** 0.9643***  0.8792  0.9347 
           
LR  46894.99 58229.52 33397.85 44585.62 43410.20 59609.75 50749.31 35996.27 10549.90 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
 
  37Table 10. Estimated Cox proportional hazard rate regression: Prepayment Hazard Ratios for ARM2 
FICO score is normalized or divided by 100.  Fees and Points are the fees and discount points charged by the lender at settlement on a 30-yr FRM 
prime mortgage, taken from the Freddie Mac PMMS Survey. House Price Growth is the appreciation of the repeat-sales OFHEO house price 
index at the MSA level. Interest Volatility is the standard deviation of the six-month LIBOR for the previous 24 months. PV Annualized Rate 
measures the ratio of the present value of the payments on mortgage principal outstanding using the existing mortgage rate to that using the current 
rate available on refinance. Unemployment Rate is the monthly series for total non-farm unemployment rate at the MSA level from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics at the time of prepayment/default. Home Value nth Quartile is a dummy that equals one if the value of the property lies in the n-th 
quartile of all property values in the data and zero otherwise. 
 
Variable  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FICO (normalized)  1.2199*** 1.2217*** 1.1682*** 1.1702*** 1.1567*** 1.1692*** 1.1069*** 1.1126*** 1.0224*** 
Fees and Points  1.05***  1.044***  1.0337***  1.036***  1.0128*** 1.0063*** 1.0177*** 1.0128*** 0.9844*** 
Prepayment Penalty  1.0088  1.0601***  1.054***  0.8299*** 0.8369*** 0.7696*** 0.7352***  0.749***  0.719*** 
Full-Doc  1.0705*** 1.0064*** 1.0416*** 1.0436*** 1.0471*** 1.0402*** 1.0443*** 1.0707***  1.0673 
House Price Growth  1.121***  1.1526*** 1.1953*** 1.0966*** 1.0538*** 1.0931*** 1.1156*** 1.1165*** 1.1375*** 
Interest Volatility  1.0015*** 1.008*** 1.0053***  1.0031*** 1.005*** 1.0034*** 0.995***  1.008*** 1.0175*** 
PV Annualized Rate  0.9997***  1.002***  1.0029*** 1.0015*** 1.0044*** 1.0249*** 1.0435*** 1.0484*** 1.0346*** 
Unemployment Rate   1.0447***  1.0501  0.9854*** 1.0549*** 1.0525*** 1.0059***  0.9705**  1.0294***  1.0324** 
Home Value First Quartile  0.7791*** 0.9534*** 0.8054*** 0.7768*** 0.7088*** 0.7775*** 0.8273***  0.8585  0.8893*** 
Home Value Second Quartile  0.8773***  0.9114***  0.8748*** 0.83*** 0.8167*** 0.84*** 0.8628***  0.9301**  0.9701*** 
Home Value Third Quartile  0.9435  0.9820  0.9168*** 0.8899*** 0.8918*** 0.8891*** 0.9111***  0.9881  1.0237 
           
LR  68087.08 102021.92 159310.47 245907.63 423865.51  780354.18 1323138.13 1084162.71  111520.70 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
 
  38Table 11. Estimated Cox proportional hazard rate regression: Default Hazard Ratios for ARM2 
FICO score is normalized or divided by 100.  Fees and Points are the fees and discount points charged by the lender at settlement on a 30-yr FRM 
prime mortgage, taken from the Freddie Mac PMMS Survey. House Price Growth is the appreciation of the repeat-sales OFHEO house price 
index at the MSA level. Interest Volatility is the standard deviation of the six-month LIBOR for the previous 24 months. PV Annualized Rate 
measures the ratio of the present value of the payments on mortgage principal outstanding using the existing mortgage rate to that using the current 
rate available on refinance. Unemployment Rate is the monthly series for total non-farm unemployment rate at the MSA level from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics at the time of prepayment/default. Home Value nth Quartile is a dummy that equals one if the value of the property lies in the n-th 
quartile of all property values in the data and zero otherwise.  
 
Variable  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FICO (normalized)  0.6009*** 0.6885*** 0.7172*** 0.5988***  0.61***  0.6109*** 0.5595*** 0.6934*** 0.8554*** 
Fees and Points  1.0883*** 1.1192*** 1.1372*** 1.0944*** 1.0409*** 1.0637*** 1.1481*** 1.0496*** 0.9523*** 
Prepayment Penalty  1.1201  0.9065*** 1.16*** 1.0039***  1.202*** 0.983***  1.0602***  1.0008***  0.7632*** 
Full-Doc  0.9352***  0.9023***  0.9262*** 0.846*** 0.8605*** 0.788*** 0.8301***  0.7574***  0.7382 
House Price Growth  0.5117*** 0.5344*** 0.5378*** 0.6518***  0.645***  0.7741*** 0.8076*** 0.8656*** 0.8482*** 
Interest Volatility  0.999***  1.0098*** 1.0144*** 1.0243*** 1.0179*** 0.9893*** 1.0195*** 1.1151***  1.057*** 
PV Annualized Rate  0.9989*** 1.0009***  1.001***  1.0006*** 1.0199*** 1.0333*** 1.0969*** 1.1444*** 1.0711*** 
Unemployment Rate   0.7355***  0.7233  0.7917*** 1.0282*** 1.0724***  1.095***  1.1175**  1.0497***  0.8988** 
Home Value First Quartile  0.877***  0.7519*** 0.8688*** 0.9669*** 0.9695*** 0.9958***  1.056***  0.9242  0.8078*** 
Home Value Second Quartile  0.7642*** 0.7466*** 0.8728***  0.965***  0.9596*** 0.9892*** 0.9657***  0.842**  0.7364*** 
Home Value Third Quartile  0.8282  0.8275  0.9204*** 1.0313*** 1.0587*** 1.0466*** 0.9862***  0.8763  0.8312 
           
LR  23046.91 45846.20 82747.68 84653.84  123727.26 170563.12 275834.03 374067.92  82194.34 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
 
  39Table 12. Estimated Cox proportional hazard rate regression: Prepayment Hazard Ratios for ARM3 
FICO score is normalized or divided by 100.  Fees and Points are the fees and discount points charged by the lender at settlement on a 30-yr FRM 
prime mortgage, taken from the Freddie Mac PMMS Survey. House Price Growth is the appreciation of the repeat-sales OFHEO house price 
index at the MSA level. Interest Volatility is the standard deviation of the six-month LIBOR for the previous 24 months. PV Annualized Rate 
measures the ratio of the present value of the payments on mortgage principal outstanding using the existing mortgage rate to that using the current 
rate available on refinance. Unemployment Rate is the monthly series for total non-farm unemployment rate at the MSA level from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics at the time of prepayment/default. Home Value nth Quartile is a dummy that equals one if the value of the property lies in the n-th 
quartile of all property values in the data and zero otherwise. 
 
Variable  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FICO (normalized)  1.1304***  1.137***  1.1483*** 1.2017*** 1.1661*** 1.1407*** 1.0747*** 1.1068***  1.069*** 
Fees and Points  1.0406***  1.028***  1.0488*** 1.0146***  0.994***  1.0005*** 1.0401*** 1.0035*** 0.9819*** 
Prepayment Penalty  1.0088  0.8749*** 0.9456*** 0.9503*** 0.9855*** 0.6838*** 0.7334*** 0.7859*** 0.7425*** 
Full-Doc  1.0553***  1.024***  1.0209*** 1.0461*** 1.0409*** 1.0336*** 1.0225*** 1.0803***  1.0511 
House Price Growth  1.0866*** 1.1432*** 1.2348*** 1.1137*** 1.0798*** 1.1115*** 1.1383*** 1.1507*** 1.1505*** 
Interest Volatility  1.0061*** 0.9965*** 1.0008*** 1.0091*** 1.0116*** 0.9878*** 0.9978*** 1.0202*** 1.0194*** 
PV Annualized Rate  1.0025*** 1.0027*** 1.0017*** 0.9992*** 1.0104*** 1.0205*** 1.0552*** 1.0694*** 1.0414*** 
Unemployment Rate   1.0351***  1.0085  1.0224*** 1.0455*** 1.0224***  1.016***  1.0066**  1.0349***  1.0108** 
Home Value First Quartile  0.693***  0.9002*** 0.7964*** 0.7641***  0.735***  0.7622*** 0.8119***  0.8099  0.816*** 
Home Value Second Quartile  0.8695*** 0.9868*** 0.8739*** 0.8385*** 0.8474*** 0.8438*** 0.8409***  0.8949**  0.8528*** 
Home Value Third Quartile  0.9201  1.0084  0.9084*** 0.9058*** 0.9192*** 0.9084*** 0.8948***  0.9654  0.9616 
           
LR  10829.47 72336.64 55620.67 55988.58 86896.08 149174.13 259137.95 104994.61  11739.56 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
 
  40Table 13. Estimated Cox proportional hazard rate regression: Default Hazard Ratios for ARM3 
FICO score is normalized or divided by 100.  Fees and Points are the fees and discount points charged by the lender at settlement on a 30-yr FRM 
prime mortgage, taken from the Freddie Mac PMMS Survey. House Price Growth is the appreciation of the repeat-sales OFHEO house price 
index at the MSA level. Interest Volatility is the standard deviation of the six-month LIBOR for the previous 24 months. PV Annualized Rate 
measures the ratio of the present value of the payments on mortgage principal outstanding using the existing mortgage rate to that using the current 
rate available on refinance. Unemployment Rate is the monthly series for total non-farm unemployment rate at the MSA level from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics at the time of prepayment/default. Home Value nth Quartile is a dummy that equals one if the value of the property lies in the n-th 
quartile of all property values in the data and zero otherwise.  
 
Variable  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FICO (normalized)  0.5845*** 0.6647*** 0.6778*** 0.6599*** 0.6433*** 0.5875*** 0.5685***  0.686***  0.7699*** 
Fees and Points  1.0978*** 1.1219***  1.133***  1.0883*** 1.0502*** 1.0876*** 1.1318***  1.056***  0.9509*** 
Prepayment Penalty  0.6226  1.1906***  1.1948***  0.7317***  1.2***  0.586*** 0.817*** 0.988*** 1.076*** 
Full-Doc  1.0845*** 0.8979*** 0.9073*** 0.8624*** 0.8857*** 0.7816*** 0.7608*** 0.7059***  0.6894 
House Price Growth  0.5236*** 0.5473*** 0.4907*** 0.6031*** 0.6094*** 0.7421*** 0.7656*** 0.7945*** 0.8038*** 
Interest Volatility  1.0031*** 1.0079*** 1.0148*** 1.0213*** 1.0138*** 1.0026*** 1.0292*** 1.0991*** 1.0585*** 
PV Annualized Rate  0.9992*** 1.0021*** 1.0013*** 1.0013*** 1.0208*** 1.0365*** 1.0957*** 1.1271*** 1.0589*** 
Unemployment Rate   0.7027***  0.7471  0.7585*** 1.0012*** 1.0331*** 1.1016***  1.0937**  1.083***  0.894** 
Home Value First Quartile  0.8024*** 0.7262*** 0.9874*** 0.9694*** 1.0328*** 0.9921*** 1.1107***  1.0097  0.7852*** 
Home Value Second Quartile  0.7467*** 0.7276*** 0.9856*** 0.9579*** 1.0435***  1.011***  1.022***  0.8895**  0.8156*** 
Home Value Third Quartile  0.7492  0.7751  1.0476*** 1.0705*** 1.1136*** 1.0555*** 1.0201***  0.9279  0.8420 
           
LR  4926.78 35987.02 29360.90 23228.41 29360.53 33643.98 51833.90 47008.79 10329.33 
p-value (H0: β =0)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
 
  41Table 14. Second Stage Loan Age Regression (OLS):  FRM  
FICO score is normalized or divided by 100.  Fees and Points are the fees and discount points charged by the lender at settlement on a 30-yr FRM 
prime mortgage, taken from the Freddie Mac PMMS Survey. House Price Growth is the appreciation of the repeat-sales OFHEO house price 
index at the MSA level. Interest Volatility is the standard deviation of the six-month LIBOR for the previous 24 months. PV Annualized Rate 
measures the ratio of the present value of the payments on mortgage principal outstanding using the existing mortgage rate to that using the current 
rate available on refinance. Unemployment Rate is the monthly series for total non-farm unemployment rate at the MSA level from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics at the time of prepayment/default. Home Value nth Quartile is a dummy that equals one if the value of the property lies in the n-th 
quartile of all property values in the data and zero otherwise. 
 
Variable  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FICO  (normalized)  -0.2984*** -0.5369*** -1.1883*** 0.2245*** 0.2047***  0.0514**  0.261*** -0.094***  0.0956*** 
Fees and Points  -1.3329***  -1.261***  -1.0492***  -0.7125*** -0.4481*** -0.4515*** -0.4228*** -0.0139*** 0.1616*** 
Prepayment Penalty  0.6926***  -0.2134  0.4531*** 0.5677*** -1.4945*** 0.8284*** 0.7063*** 0.6484*** 0.7209*** 
Full-Doc  -0.5892*** -0.7593*** -0.2519***  -0.0761  0.0165  -0.1514*** 0.0582*** -0.0891*** 0.1955*** 
House Price Growth  0.5475***  0.0062  0.1581***  0.4616***  -0.1936*** -0.72*** -0.5347***  -0.3199***  -0.0508*** 
Interest  Volatility  -0.1008*** -0.1349*** -0.1581*** -0.1373*** -0.0456***  -0.01***  -0.0794*** -0.1578*** -0.1309*** 
PV  Annualized  Rate  -0.0339*** -0.0536*** -0.0508*** -0.0447*** -0.1723***  -0.246***  -0.3921*** -0.3497*** -0.1699*** 
Unemployment  Rate    0.7058*** 0.6053*** 0.2675*** -2.2933*** -1.1688*** -0.5707*** -0.1745*** -0.0821***  0.0396** 
Home Value First Quartile  1.8756***  0.9784*** 2.6754*** 2.9431*** 2.8473*** 1.5918*** 0.3684*** 0.5051*** 0.6472*** 
Home Value Second Quartile  1.524***  0.9682*** 1.3864*** 1.7505*** 1.5476*** 1.1792*** 0.5542*** 0.3313*** 0.1897*** 
Home Value Third Quartile  0.876***  0.6789*** 0.7981*** 0.6316*** 0.6851*** 0.8759*** 0.3561*** 0.1435***  0.0194 
           
Adjusted R-Squared   0.8296   0.8537   0.8495   0.6311   0.6970   0.7484   0.8017   0.8346   0.4811 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
 
  
  42Table 15. Second Stage Loan Age Regression (OLS):  ARM2  
FICO score is normalized or divided by 100.  Fees and Points are the fees and discount points charged by the lender at settlement on a 30-yr FRM 
prime mortgage, taken from the Freddie Mac PMMS Survey. House Price Growth is the appreciation of the repeat-sales OFHEO house price 
index at the MSA level. Interest Volatility is the standard deviation of the six-month LIBOR for the previous 24 months. PV Annualized Rate 
measures the ratio of the present value of the payments on mortgage principal outstanding using the existing mortgage rate to that using the current 
rate available on refinance. Unemployment Rate is the monthly series for total non-farm unemployment rate at the MSA level from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics at the time of prepayment/default. Home Value nth Quartile is a dummy that equals one if the value of the property lies in the n-th 
quartile of all property values in the data and zero otherwise. 
 
Variable  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FICO (normalized)  -0.1606**  -0.1305**  0.3832*** 0.8942*** 0.1154*** 0.1519*** 0.1821*** -0.3484*** 0.0565*** 
Fees and Points  -1.1017***  -0.9545***  -0.8891***  -0.5747*** -0.3314*** -0.1994*** -0.2431*** -0.0547*** 0.1588*** 
Prepayment Penalty  -0.8212***  -0.5084***  0.1127  1.0271*** 0.7261*** 0.9116***  0.7852*** 0.96*** 2.2106*** 
Full-Doc -0.4131***  0.0992  0.0502  0.2105***  -0.0629*** 0.1104***  -0.007  -0.1949*** 0.1179*** 
House Price Growth  0.2245***  0.0695***  0.1818***  0.4829***  0.1399*** -0.1469*** -0.2078*** -0.3062*** -0.1642*** 
Interest  Volatility  -0.1033*** -0.1472*** -0.1253*** -0.0358*** -0.0359*** -0.0233*** -0.0167*** -0.0965*** -0.1148*** 
PV  Annualized  Rate  -0.0161*** -0.0553*** -0.0505*** -0.0282*** -0.0638*** -0.1609*** -0.2557*** -0.2431*** -0.1624*** 
Unemployment Rate   0.4268***  0.323***  0.4013***  -0.9466*** -0.7736*** -0.3248*** -0.1084*** -0.1152*** 0.0381*** 
Home Value First Quartile  2.2825***  0.5711*** 1.4839*** 1.0023*** 2.0166*** 1.0688*** 0.3412*** 0.4233***  0.657*** 
Home Value Second Quartile  1.3895***  0.8311*** 0.8601*** 1.0965*** 1.1932*** 0.8143*** 0.4087*** 0.2273***  0.345*** 
Home Value Third Quartile  0.8249***  0.366***  0.4621*** 0.3736*** 0.5557***  0.516***  0.2584*** 0.0806*** 0.0619*** 
           
Adjusted R-Squared   0.8548   0.8792   0.8407   0.7525   0.7370   0.8209   0.8733   0.9188   0.5111 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
 
  
  43Table 16. Second Stage Loan Age Regression (OLS):  ARM3  
FICO score is normalized or divided by 100.  Fees and Points are the fees and discount points charged by the lender at settlement on a 30-yr FRM 
prime mortgage, taken from the Freddie Mac PMMS Survey. House Price Growth is the appreciation of the repeat-sales OFHEO house price 
index at the MSA level. Interest Volatility is the standard deviation of the six-month LIBOR for the previous 24 months. PV Annualized Rate 
measures the ratio of the present value of the payments on mortgage principal outstanding using the existing mortgage rate to that using the current 
rate available on refinance. Unemployment Rate is the monthly series for total non-farm unemployment rate at the MSA level from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics at the time of prepayment/default. Home Value nth Quartile is a dummy that equals one if the value of the property lies in the n-th 
quartile of all property values in the data and zero otherwise. 
 
Variable  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FICO  (normalized)  0.7706*** -0.2919*** 0.5731*** 0.1413** 0.2018*** -0.0494* 0.3186*** 0.036**  0.0352 
Fees and Points  -0.9447***  -0.8951***  -0.7873***  -0.4737*** -0.1655*** -0.1413*** -0.3667*** -0.0366*** 0.1584*** 
Prepayment Penalty  0.29  1.7978***  -0.1044  1.2546*** -0.4604*** 2.1453*** 1.0761*** 0.7181*** 1.4591*** 
Full-Doc -0.8236***  -0.2076*  0.106  0.004  0.1353***  -0.0199  0.1525*** 0.0839*** 0.2641*** 
House Price Growth  0.6298***  -0.1149***  0.2641***  0.2031***  0.115***  -0.2877*** -0.3569*** -0.2952*** -0.0735*** 
Interest  Volatility  -0.1208*** -0.0658*** -0.0525*** -0.0879*** -0.1014***  0.054***  -0.0383*** -0.1597*** -0.1255*** 
PV Annualized Rate  -0.0484***  -0.055***  -0.0382*** 0.0023*** -0.0943*** -0.1686*** -0.3166*** -0.3477*** -0.1579*** 
Unemployment Rate   0.7383***  0.7924***  0.226***  -0.7191*** -0.3652*** -0.2235*** -0.3499*** -0.2022*** 0.0648*** 
Home Value First Quartile  3.7336***  1.7117*** 1.0203***  1.507***  1.5006*** 1.1627*** 0.4057*** 0.4783*** 0.9881*** 
Home Value Second Quartile  1.3777***  0.7125*** 0.6056*** 1.1483*** 0.7835*** 0.7667***  0.5278*** 0.41*** 0.6334*** 
Home Value Third Quartile  0.5987**  0.3846*** 0.2662*** 0.4362*** 0.2135*** 0.4432*** 0.3386*** 0.1869*** 0.1965*** 
           
Adjusted R-Squared   0.8583   0.8464   0.8940   0.8208   0.8378   0.8878   0.8782   0.8436   0.4959 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels respectively.  
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